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David Konstan, A Life Worthy of the Gods. The Materialist Psychology of Epicurus. Revised and expanded edition, xx-176 p. Price: $34. Las Vegas (NV), Parmenides Publishing, 2008. ISBN 978-1-930972-28-5.
The publication of a new edition of a comparatively old work requires a high degree of science. How should one update the results of thirty-year-old research without giving the reader the impression that you backed out, or worse, by merely offering in a slightly amended form the same thoughts and arguments? It must be admitted that David Konstan, with the talent that he is known for, has achieved a significant level of perfection in this genre with the reissue of Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology (Leiden, Brill, 1973). He has succeeded in proposing something new, up-to-date and subtle with a great deal of intellectual honesty and daring.
The book retains the overall structure of the first version, thus it is still about Epicurean "psychology", that is, issues related to human emotions as they are addressed and resolved by the ethics of the Garden. Thus Konstan does not seek any more than in 1973 to take on the whole philosophy of Epicurus, nor even everything related to his ethical doctrine, but rather to concentrate on questions related to the nature of the human soul: how the Epicurean treatment of fears and desires influences and governs their view of social relations. Setting out from here he deals with some cardinal points of atomic physics or even of epistemology to determine the material basis of these passions and emotions. But he has modified this structure both by adding new parts - including the first chapter, hitherto unpublished - and by taking into account the latest research that sometimes leads him to make profound changes in some of his previous assumptions. D. Konstan thus seeks to propose a reading that takes into account research results of recent years in regard to the Epicurean corpus itself and also new hermeneutical methods developed by contemporary trends in the philosophy of science and in psychology. This leads him of course, in addition to original analyses, to provide a thoroughly revised and updated bibliography, which will be more than useful to researchers interested in these tough questions.
As regards the corpus Konstan notably integrates into his investigation the new texts produced by work on the papyri of Herculaneum, both those of Epicurus himself and those of Philodemus of Gadara. The latter author is of particular interest, because texts of his that have been passed down to us in the charred rolls of Herculaneum in many cases concern issues related to the nature of the emotions and to the attitudes that the sage must adopt in regard to them. Thus we find in this book some remarkable analyses of these texts of Philodemus that have only recently been presented to researchers. For this reason the work will provide a major stimulus to anyone interested directly or indirectly by ancient Epicureanism. Philodemus' work On Piety, edited by D. Obbink in 1996, is given special attention.
The new analyses presented by D. Konstan in this book are arranged around a bold thesis on the nature of the pathè in Epicurus which he argues for in the first chapter. Konstan demonstrates that Epicurus identifies the pathè with the affects of pleasure and pain, and that these emotions take place, as do the sensations, in the irrational part of the soul – while emphasizing how this division of the soul into a rational and an irrational part even in Epicurus is subject to debate. Every emotion linked to the outbreak of one of the affects of pleasure or pain (fear, anger, joy, etc.) is, however, associated with the judgment, that is, with the rational part of the soul. All of Epicurus' psychology and the ethics dictated by it flows, as he argues, from this fundamental division.
This thesis is well argued, and for this reason, the work of D. Konstan will open the way for fruitful discussions. It would thus be particularly interesting to compare Konstan's analysis with the results recently proposed by V. Tsounis in his commentary on the ethical texts of Philodemus – which Konstan does not refers to for obvious reasons related to their almost simultaneous publication. The subtle hierarchies of the various emotions in Philodemus' treatment would certainly contribute new elements to the highly enlightening attempt by D. Konstan to provide a new view of the Epicurean distinction between what is rational and what is not.
Julie GIOVACCHINI
Translated by
John Dudley
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