From The Review of Metaphysics 46(1992-93). 157-58
A Review of Halper's One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: The Central Books written by Arthur Madigan, SJ, of Boston College
Halper, Edward C. One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: the Central Books. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989. Xl + 309 pp. $48.50 -
This is the second volume (though the first to appear) of a three-volume study of one and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics. It covers Metaphysics 6, 7, 8, and 9. Chapter 4 summarizes the results of the textual analysis. Halper argues against three interpretations of form. (1) Against the view that form is individual, he presents texts showing the universality and knowability of form. Form is universal because it is one in formula. (2) Against the view that form is a kind of universal (a species-form or lowest-level universal), he presents texts which insist on the numerical unity of form. Form is individual because it is numerically one. (3) The view that form is neither universal nor individual does not square with the requirement that form be the cause of unity in a thing.
Halper's view is that form is both universal and individual. It is not that form is a universal or that form is an individual, but rather form possesses characteristics of universality (the unity in formula by which form serves as principle of becoming and f knowledge), and characteristics of individuality (the numerical unity by which form serves as principle of a thing's unity and being). So characterized, form resolves aporiai: whether the principles of things are their kinds or their constituents; whether there is some principle apart from individuals; whether principles are one in number or one in species. Form breaks these aporiai by possessing seemingly contrary types of unity. Platonic Form was supposed to combine these types of unity, but failed to do so. Aristotle does not reject the notion of something's being both universal and particular; he intends his own forms to be exactly that. He does not change the Platonic requirements for principles; he meets them (p. 246).
This combination of types of unity is grounded in form's actuality. Actuality causes numerical unity in a composite by causing continuity between or among the materials constituents. Actuality also makes form to be one in formula. Form is an actuality, and so it is without parts; it is numerically one and its formula is indivisible (p. 248). Actuality is the function in virtue of which a thing is what it is, a function which is also a capacity and which is its own end (pp. 249-50).
The problem of individuation is really two problems. If we ask for the principle that makes one composite different from other composites, the answer is matter, but if we ask for the principle of the composite's identity, the answer is form (p. 251). Of its own nature form individuates itself by a physical process. Form imitates pure actuality by manifesting itself in a plurality of instances. Reproduction, development, and plurality of composites are aspects of form's self-manifestation in matter. (How this works is a problem of physics, not strictly of metaphysics.) “From the perspective of form, individuals are merely vehicles for form's continued existence” (p. 252).
Halper's prose is clear, his argumentation forceful. His analytical Table of Contents, Glossary, Bibliography, and Index are helpful. Some readers may find that Halper makes the central books tidier than they actually are, and his Aristotle may strike some readers as too Platonic. But his proposals are grounded on meticulous textual analyses, and his interpretation of Aristotelian form merits the attention of every serious student.
